In the last post, we discussed whether computers could have mental states. This is a highly controversial issue, especially among philosophers. What’s relatively not controversial, even among philosophers, is whether animals have mental states. By “animals” I mean non-human animals. Anyone who has had a cat or a dog as a pet takes it for granted that animals have mental states. Many pet owners describe their pets as being highly intelligent. [Watch this video and you will see some amazing intelligent crow behavior.] Besides intelligence, many pet owners say that their animals have the following mental states: sensations (e.g. they are in pain), perceptions (e.g. they can see and smell and hear and taste), emotions (e.g. they are scared or excited or happy), desires (e.g. they are hungry or tired) and memories (e.g. they remember where who you are or where a bone is buried – check out this video). Some pet owners even insist that their dogs dream. If these pet owners are correct, then animals, at least some of them, such as dogs, maybe even cats, have many of the types of mental states that humans have.
But how similar are the mental states of non-human animals to the mental states of humans? Humans have thoughts about things. But can dogs or cats have thoughts about things? When you have a thought about something you think about it in a certain way, from a certain ‘conceptual point of view’. For instance, I think that there are electric cars in the United States, my thought is directed at something (cars) under a certain description (as being electric and existing in the United States). If we say that an animal has a thought, do we know what the thought is about. For instance, if you tell a dog to jump in the car, and the dog does it, do we know what the dog is thinking about? Is it thinking anything about the car? Does it think of it as something that has wheels or an engine? Probably not. If it is thinking of it as a car, how does it conceive of a car? If we cannot answer this, can we say that it has an thought about the car, or more generally, any thoughts at all?
Even if we can know that animals have thoughts and what their thoughts are about, there isn’t much evidence that most animals have higher-order thoughts. A higher-order thought is a thought that is directed at another mental state, such as being in pain. We have thoughts about things in the world, e.g. cars and trees. But we also can think about our thoughts about these things. We can also think about the thoughts of others. Thus, we have higher-order thoughts.
According to some philosophers, the fact that we have higher-order thoughts explains why our actions can be morally evaluated. When we do something for a reason, we can think think about the reason and evaluate whether it’s a moral reason. Did she kill her husband because she thought she was threatened? If her reason for acting was that she felt threatened, then we may decide that her act of killing is not wrong. Animals seem to act for reasons. The cat bit my foot because he was hungry. But is there any evidence that an animal can think about its reasons for acting. Can the cat think about its hunger. There is little to no evidence that a dog or a cat can think about its own thoughts or the thoughts of others. Furthermore, if an animal cannot think about its own thoughts, then, according to some philosophers, this means that the animal cannot have conscious mental states.
Before we discuss these challenges to animal mental states, I want to explain why most philosophers agree with pet owners that animals have at least some mental states, even though we cannot experience or directly observe them.
In an earlier post we explained how a type of reasoning known as inference to the best explanation can be used to argue for the existence of things that cannot be directly observed. Let us remind you of how it goes. We offer an explanation for some observable feature that everyone agrees takes place. For example, we see someone woman throw up and we offer an explanation for why she is throwing up. The explanation assumes the existence of some entity that cannot be directly observed (e.g. pathogens in the food that she ate). If this explanation is the best explanation of the observed feature (throwing up), then we have reason to believe in the existence of the entity that cannot be observed (pathogens).
Let’s apply this type of reasoning to human behavior. Why, for example, is Tom smiling at Joan? One possible explanation is that Tom is happy to see Joan. We cannot directly observe Tom’s happiness. But if this explanation is the best explanation for his smiling at Joan, then we have reason to believe that he has the mental state of happiness, which cannot be directly observed. We can also ask Tom why he is smiling at Joan. He might confirm our explanation and say that he’s happy to see her. His verbal answer is a piece of behavior, just as smiling is a piece of behavior, that needs to be explained. If Tom is an honest person, then we have reason to believe what he says.
In a similar vein, we can use an inference to the best explanation type of argument to argue for the existence of mental states in animals. We offer an explanation for the behavior of animals that we all agree takes place. Why, for example, is the dog barking at the rat on the floor? One possible explanation is that the dog sees something and is excited. This explanation assumes the existence of mental states, specifically the mental states of excitement and seeing. If this is the best explanation for the dogs barking behavior, then we have reason to believe that dogs have these two mental states, even though we cannot observe them.
An inference to the best explanation does not prove conclusively that the unobserved entities (i.e. the pathogens, happiness, excitement and seeing) exist. But they give us tentative reason to believe that they do exist.
There is a problem. When we use inference to the best explanation with animal behavior we cannot appeal to verbal behavior as we can with people. If a person says that “I believe that there is a rat on the floor” we have a piece of verbal behavior to infer that the person believes that there is a rat on the floor. Dogs communicate, but they obviously do not speak our language, which describes things. So if we see a dog chasing a rat around, it’s not clear whether we can appeal to any thought to explain its behavior. Does it, for example, behave as it does because of any thoughts it has? If so, what is the content of its thought? Does it think that there is rat on the floor? The problem is that since the dog doesn’t speak our language, it’s not clear why we should believe it has any of our concepts, such as “rat” or “floor” or “on” or “run away”. If it doesn’t have at a minimum the concept of a rat, it cannot have any thoughts about rats. And if we cannot specify any concepts that a dog has, then its not clear why we should attribute any thoughts to it at all.
To say that a dog doesn’t have any thoughts about the rat is not to say that the dog isn’t seeing a rat. We have good reason to believe that it’s seeing a rat. But is it seeing the rat as a rat? It may be seeing it as a grey moving object.
A dog may not have any thoughts about rats. But what about other things, such as balls? Suppose you have many different dog toys in a room and one of these dog toys is a ball. You tell the dog to get the ball and the dog retrieves it every time you ask it to do so. What’s the best explanation for this behavior? You might think that it has a thought about the ball. But does it? Does it understand what a ball is? It might understand that this particular object that it’s being asked to fetch has a certain odor. So when it hears you say “ball” it associates the word with the odor and gets the ball. But this doesn’t indicate that the dog has the concept of “ball”.
It may be the case that animals have certain concepts, but since the animal cannot use our language which indicates conceptual understanding, it’s not clear what concepts it has. And if it’s not clear what concepts it has, it’s difficult to say with any confidence what the animal is thinking about because to have a thought is to think about something using concepts. If we cannot know what an animal is thinking about, it’s not clear whether we can even say the animal has any thoughts at all.
Even if dogs and cats have thoughts, there is scant evidence that they have higher-order thoughts. To repeat, a higher-order thoughts is a mental state that is directed at another mental state. We are able to think about our own mental states as well as the mental states of others. I can think that I’m feeling a certain sensation. But there is no evidence that a dog can think about its sensations. So even if a dog thinks that there is a rat on the floor (which is highly questionable), we have no reason to believe that it has a thought about this thought.
If an animal does not have any higher-order mental states, then it can’t have empathy towards others because to feel empathy towards others you have be able to understand how they feel. But if you cannot think about others’ mental states, then you cannot have any understanding of how others feel.
If an animal does not have any higher-order thought, can its mental states be conscious? This is a controversial view. According to some philosophers, the answer is no; you need to be able to think about your thoughts in order for your thoughts to be conscious. So if a dog doesn’t have any higher-order thoughts, then, according to these philosophers, the dog doesn’t have any conscious thoughts. This means that if a dog perceives something, say, by smelling it, there is no way this smell seems to the dog; there is nothing it’s like for the dog. It also means that if a dog has a sensation, such as a pain, it doesn’t feel anything.
How can a dog have nonconscious experience? You might think this cannot make any sense. When a being has an experience of any sort doesn’t it necessarily have to seem or feel some way it? Doesn’t it follow that if a dog smells something there is something it’s like for the dog to have this experience? And if the dog has a pain, isn’t there some way this sensation feels to the dog? Some philosophers believe the answer is no. They believe that there are real life cases that indicate that you can have nonconscious experiences. Consider, for example, doing something in an absent-minded way, such as driving a long distance thinking about something besides what it is in your current environment, such as other cars and the road. You had to be perceiving these surroundings while you were driving in this absent-minded way, or else you would have crashed your car. However, did these surroundings appear any way to me? Were you conscious of them? If you were asked to describe any features of these surroundings, such as the color of the cars, you might not be able to. So is this a case where you’re perceiving things (the road and cars), but are not consciously perceiving them?
Some philosophers also believe a condition known as blindsight is empirical evidence of non-conscious perception. People who have blindsight have a problem with their visual cortex, and as a result are “blind” in an area of their visual field. I put the word “blind” in quotation marks because these blindsighted people sincerely claim that they don’t have any consciousness of any stimulus in a certain area of their visual field. However, when asked to guess as to whether a stimulus is present or asked to guess about specific features of the stimulus, such as whether it is an ‘X’ or an ‘O’, they do considerably better than chance. These individuals still seem to have some sort of “sight” or awareness, but they lack consciousness of what they are “seeing”; there is nothing it’s like for these people to have this awareness. Does this indicate that being aware of something and being conscious of it may come apart? [Watch this and this on blindsight.]
But isn’t there some behavioral evidence that dogs and cats can think about the mental states of other beings? My cat bangs on the window because he wants to come in. Doesn’t this indicate that my cat is aware that I see it at the window or can hear it when it bangs its tail on it? Not necessarily. My cat may know that that banging on the window causes me to behave. But it doesn’t follow that my cat knows why I’m behaving the way I do, namely because I see the cat or hear it bang. Similarly, something like this can be said when a pet will treat its owner differently when the owner is sad. The pet is not thinking or being aware of the owner’s emotions. Rather, it’s just reacting to different behavior.
There is some evidence that some animals use deception to out-compete their rival. If animals do deceive the way we deceive, then they would have higher-order thoughts. When we deceive we are aware of what someone else believes or is aware of. Monkeys seem be aware that others can see. They will steal a grape from someone who they see is looking away from it, but not from someone who they see is looking at the grape. If the monkey is aware that others see, then the monkey has higher-order mental states. [Watch this video where Laurie Santos discusses deception as evidence to show that certain animals have a capacity to think about other animals’ mental states. She refers to this capacity as a theory of mind.]
Some researchers and philosophers believe that animals, such as chimpanzees and orangutans, that consistently pass the mark-mirror test have higher-order thoughts. In 1961 the psychologist Gordon Gallup conducted an experiment involving the presentation of a full-length mirror to chimpanzees to see if they were ‘self-aware’. He noticed that initially these chimpanzees reacted to the reflections as if they were seeing other chimpanzees. But after a few days these chimpanzees started using the mirrors to inspect the inside of their mouths and other parts of their bodies that they had never seen before. Gallup thought they were learning to recognize themselves. To test this hypothesis he anesthetized each of these chimpanzees and placed some marks with red dye on their faces and ears. After the chimpanzees awakened and looked in the mirrors they began to touch the red marks. When Gallup put the marks on chimpanzees that had not had any prior experience with the mirrors they failed to locate them. Gallup concluded from this mirror test experiment that the chimpanzee is ‘self-aware’ in the sense that it’s having thoughts of trying and intending to use its own, which means that it’s thinking of its own mental states (i.e. trying and intending). [Watch this video on the mark-mirror test.]
Is Gallup correct in hiss interpretation of what’s going on with these chimpanzees who pass the mirror test? Some animal researchers do not think so. Instead, they think that there is a simpler explanation for why the chimpanzees trained with mirrors try to locate the marks on their faces. It’s not that they are thinking “That’s my body that I’m controlling”. Rather, they are thinking “That body in the mirror corresponds to this [mentally pointing to some part of their body]”. If this interpretation is correct, then the results of the mirror test do not support the hypothesis that chimpanzees have higher-order thoughts.
