Daily Archives: Friday, August 25, 2017

  • to Philosophy of Mind"> An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind

    When you think about the mind you can easily find yourself feeling confused. You might start asking questions like these: What is a mind? How does it relate to the body, something that is physical? Is it something we have control over? How does one know that other people have minds? Could computers have minds? Do animals have minds? These are the sorts of questions that philosophers of mind wonder about and have also given answers to. Though there is no consensus to these answers. In the lectures to come, you will get to think about these questions and other related questions. You will see how philosophers think about them too. As you ponder the questions try to think slowly about them. I once read that to do philosophy is to think in slow motion. You may react initially emotionally to a question, but try to fight this reaction. Think about your reasons for your beliefs and think about why someone might disagree with you. You strengthen your views when you can give reasonable responses to objections to them. The questions that philosophers ask about the mind are difficult to answer. This is why philosophers are still trying to answer them for so many centuries.  Part of the reason philosophy is enjoyed is that it can be therapeutic. Even if you can’t be sure of the answers to the questions, the act of thinking about them in a slow, reasoned way can sometimes help remove some of the confusion.

    In the paragraph above I used the term ‘mind’. However, in the lectures I will rarely, if ever, use this term. Instead, I will use the term ‘mental state’ for two reasons. One reason I do this is that the term ‘mind’ may suggest that it is a kind of thing, and this view is controversial. Some philosophers do think of the mind as a kind of thing that has or supports mental states, such as thoughts and feelings. But there are other philosophers who think of the mind, not as a thing, but rather as collection of mental states, that belong to a brain. Although philosophers disagree about whether a mind is a thing, almost all agree that there are mental states. Another reason I have chosen to use the term ‘mental state’ instead of ‘mind’ in the lectures is that the term ‘mind’ may cause you to think that we’re just talking about human minds. We must, however, think more generally when thinking about the mind, for there may be other things besides humans that may have minds. Most of us believe that animals have minds. Some philosophers believe that computers could have minds. If there are extra-terrestrial beings or if God exists, we may wonder about their minds. So for the sake of generality, the questions that we will explore will focus on mental states, not minds. Let me say a little more about these questions. (more…)

  • Do Mental States Exist?

    There are some, not many, philosophers who argue that there are no mental states – i.e. no thoughts, feelings, dreams, emotions, perceptions, intentions, etc. These philosophers are called eliminativists and their view is called eliminativism. To put it mildly, eliminativism is not a common-sense view. In fact, some have called it a crazy view. It’s clearly a radical view as it challenges a fundamental way we think of ourselves. The following views about mental states, which are taken for granted by most people, would all be false if eliminativism is true:

    • Mental states play a causal role in behavior.
    • Animals have mental states.
    • You can only experience your own mental states.
    • You can know about the contents of your own mental states
    • There are similarities and differences between people’s mental states.
    • Mental states are related to what’s going on in the brain.
    • The quality of an individual’s life depends on his or her mental states.
    • The morality of actions depend on mental states.

    Another implication of eliminativism, albeit not necessarily a negative one, is that many philosophical problems in philosophy of mind would be rendered moot. If there are no mental states, then there wouldn’t be any question about…

    • what the objects of mental states are – whether they are sense-data or objects in the world.
    • whether mental states belong to a non-physical substance.
    • how mental states are related to what’s going on in the brain.
    • how could we know about the mental states of others.
    • whether we have any mental states, such as higher-order mental states, that animals do not have.
    • whether computers could have mental states.
    • whether a person’s actions are free if they are caused by mental states.

    Eliminativists belong to a long tradition of philosophers who have denied the existence of one thing or another that many people have taken for granted. In previous lectures, we’ve discussed some of these philosophers, such as those who have denied non-physical substances and those who have denied the existence of free will. Some of you may belong to this tradition if you deny the existence of God. But even if you believe in the existence of non-physical substances or free will or God, you probably aren’t as confident about whether these things exist as you are about whether your mental states exist. You may even be like some philosophers who are more confident that your mental states exist than anything else in the universe exists. The 17th century French philosopher Rene Descartes, the philosopher who believed that mental states are states of a non-physical substance, was one such philosopher. He argued that the existence of everything in the physical world, such as tables and trees and planets and brains, could be doubted because he thought he could be dreaming these things or an all-powerful evil Demon could be deceiving him into thinking that they were existing. But he didn’t think he could doubt the contents of his own mind. He was certain of what he was thinking and perceiving and feeling. If eliminativism is true, then Descartes’ view is false; if there are no mental states, then one cannot have any doubts and there would be no contents of mental states to doubt.

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